POLICY BRIEF

EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

The UAE’s exit from OPEC did not emerge in a vacuum. For years, Abu Dhabi chafed under production quotas that it viewed as structurally disadvantageous. With a production capacity reaching 4.85 million barrels per day (b/d) by 2024 and an ambition to expand to 5 million b/d by 2027, the UAE found the cartel’s quota discipline an increasingly costly constraint. Its state oil company, ADNOC, has committed to $145 billion in upstream investment through 2030. Remaining inside OPEC meant leaving money on the table while other members — notably Iraq and Russia — routinely exceeded their quotas without consequence.

The immediate trigger was geopolitical. The UAE-Saudi bilateral relationship, already strained by disagreements over the Yemen war and competing visions of Gulf regional order, deteriorated sharply in late 2025. When the joint US-Israel strikes on Iran began in early 2026, the UAE and Saudi Arabia diverged: Riyadh inclined toward a diplomatic solution alongside Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey, while Abu Dhabi — having endured Iran’s most intense direct attacks — demanded harder security guarantees before any settlement. The decision to leave OPEC, long contemplated, was crystallized by this rupture.

The withdrawal became effective on 1 May 2026. UAE Energy Minister Suhail Mohamed al-Mazrouei stated the decision was taken after a “careful look at current and future policies related to level of production.” Notably, the UAE did not consult Saudi Arabia or any other member before announcing the move.

The table below sets out the key production parameters and BRICS affiliations of major OPEC and OPEC+ members, providing context for the UAE’s relative weight in the cartel and the landscape of producer relationships relevant to BRICS.

Sources:
Rystad Energy, Wood Mackenzie, IEA Oil Market Report (April 2026). Figures are approximate. mb/d = million barrels per day.

3.1 A Structurally Weakened Cartel

The UAE was, by most analyses, the second most influential member of OPEC after Saudi Arabia. It held the rare distinction of possessing meaningful spare production capacity — the idle output that can be activated quickly to respond to supply shocks. Losing a producer with nearly 5 million b/d of capacity and plans to expand further is, in the words of Rystad Energy’s head of geopolitical analysis Jorge León, “the biggest schism in the organisation since it was founded in 1960.” OPEC will be structurally weaker as a consequence.

The practical implication is reduced collective discipline. Saudi Arabia retains the largest share of global spare capacity, but its ability to manage OPEC’s internal dynamics is diminished without the UAE’s participation. The cartel currently controls approximately 33 percent of global oil supply, down from 50 percent in the 1970s, and faces an increasing risk of irrelevance if further defections follow.

A near-term mitigating factor exists: the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz has constrained the UAE’s offshore production. With close to 2 million b/d currently shut in, Abu Dhabi’s ability to immediately capitalize on its freedom from quotas is limited. The more consequential market impact — competition between a liberated UAE and OPEC for market share — is therefore more likely to materialize in 2027 and beyond.

3.2 Oil Price Volatility and the Medium-Term Outlook

Analysts are broadly bearish on medium-term oil prices as a result of the UAE’s departure. With global demand approaching a structural peak, the economic logic for low-cost producers is shifting: waiting inside a quota system increasingly resembles forgoing revenue. An unleashed UAE, producing at capacity, could contribute to oversupply conditions that weaken OPEC’s price floor. For BRICS economies that are large oil importers — most significantly India and China — a medium-term trend toward lower prices eases import bills, but heightened volatility complicates long-term energy procurement and can destabilize the fiscal frameworks of Gulf states that are also BRICS partners.

— Anas Abdoun, International
Consultant in Energy and Global Affairs, Al Jazeera

4.1 De-Dollarization and the Petrodollar System

Perhaps the most consequential long-run implication for BRICS is the accelerated erosion of the petrodollar architecture. OPEC, historically dominated by Saudi Arabia’s alignment with US security guarantees, has functioned as an implicit institutional pillar reinforcing oil pricing in US dollars. The UAE’s exit weakens OPEC’s ability to coordinate supply at precisely the moment when coordination matters most — during acute price volatility — and deals a symbolic blow to the cartel’s role as a guarantor of the dollar-denominated energy order.

This matters directly for BRICS’ ongoing de-dollarization agenda. Since January 2024, the UAE has been a full BRICS member, and the dirham is already playing a measurable role in alternative energy settlement. By March 2026, Indian refiners were settling significant volumes of Russian crude purchases in Chinese yuan and UAE dirhams, bypassing the US dollar entirely. Iran is charging yuan-denominated transit tolls at the Strait of Hormuz. BRICS Pay and the mBridge platform — which connects the central banks of China, Hong Kong, Thailand, and the UAE through digital national currencies — are processing an expanding volume of transactions outside the dollar system.

A UAE unmoored from OPEC’s institutional constraints may find it easier to engage more deeply in non-dollar energy settlements. The dirham’s role in triangular trade flows between Russian producers, South Asian importers, and Gulf transit hubs is already growing. The UAE’s departure from OPEC removes one institutional vector through which Washington could exert indirect pressure on Abu Dhabi’s energy trading practices.

4.2 Saudi Arabia, BRICS Membership, and Internal Bloc Dynamics

Saudi Arabia’s relationship with BRICS is a critical variable. Riyadh attended the 2023 Johannesburg summit and has been in the process of formally joining the expanded BRICS+ grouping. Yet the Saudi-UAE rupture now defines Gulf geopolitics. Riyadh’s instinct — to preserve OPEC’s collective management function — is structurally at odds with Abu Dhabi’s new posture of unilateral maximization.

For BRICS as an institution, this creates an internal tension. The bloc now contains a Saudi Arabia invested in OPEC’s survival and a UAE that has just rendered OPEC structurally weaker. Managing this tension will require careful diplomatic navigation, particularly as both states are significant partners for India and China. Beijing, importing roughly 1.8 million b/d from the Gulf, has strong interests in both stable pricing and diversified, non-dollar trade channels. India faces a similarly layered calculus: heavily invested in the UAE dirham’s growing role in non-dollar settlement, while publicly maintaining it does not pursue a policy of displacing the US dollar.

4.3 Russia’s Strategic Calculus

For Russia, the UAE’s departure from OPEC is broadly welcome news. Moscow has been a key OPEC+ participant since 2016 but has consistently resisted quota discipline. A weakened cartel with less cohesion serves Russian interests. More importantly, the deepening UAE role in facilitating non-dollar Russian oil exports — through dirham settlement and the UAE’s status as a re-export and transit hub — is a strategic asset Russia will seek to consolidate. Russia-UAE trade expanded substantially after 2022 sanctions isolated Moscow from Western financial infrastructure. From Moscow’s perspective, the fragmentation of OPEC’s authority is a dividend of the broader multipolarity it has been strategically promoting.

4.4 Opportunity: BRICS as an Alternative Energy Governance Framework

The institutional vacuum created by OPEC’s structural weakening may represent an opportunity for BRICS to develop its own energy governance architecture. The bloc currently lacks a formal mechanism for coordinating energy production, pricing, or trade — but the geopolitical conditions for such a framework are ripening. A BRICS energy forum could align the interests of producer members (Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE) with those of large consumer members (India, China) and help bridge the Riyadh-Abu Dhabi diplomatic rift.

The New Development Bank (NDB) already provides a financial vehicle for energy infrastructure investment in the Global South. Linking NDB financing to energy trade denominated in BRICS currencies — particularly for renewable energy transitions in emerging markets — could create a reinforcing loop between the de-dollarization agenda and the bloc’s development finance ambitions.

The opportunities above must be weighed against real risks. First, a UAE operating outside OPEC constraints and pursuing maximum market share could contribute to oil price volatility that disproportionately harms the fiscal sustainability of other BRICS-aligned Gulf producers, particularly Saudi Arabia. If competition between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh for market share sends medium-term prices sharply lower, it could stress Saudi fiscal positions and destabilize one of BRICS’ most important prospective members.

Second, the UAE’s withdrawal has been characterized by Saudi officials as influenced by the West — specifically by the Trump administration’s longstanding hostility to OPEC. If this narrative gains traction, it could introduce a fracture within BRICS: is the UAE’s new energy posture aligned with the bloc’s multipolar agenda, or does it serve US interests in dismantling the cartel? Abu Dhabi’s dual positioning — deep in BRICS institutions but also bound by the Abraham Accords and strong ties to Washington and Tel Aviv — will make this question unavoidable.

Third, the immediate Iran conflict context introduces direct uncertainty for BRICS energy supply chains. The Strait of Hormuz disruption affects the oil export infrastructure of multiple BRICS-aligned producers simultaneously. Any escalation that further compromises Hormuz transit will hit BRICS consumer  economies hard, regardless of OPEC’s institutional status.

6.1 Institutional Architecture

The following foundational measures are recommended to build durable BRICS energy governance capacity:

1. Establish a BRICS Energy Dialogue: Convene a formal, high-level forum of BRICS energy ministers meeting at least biannually. The forum should address pricing coordination, supply security, and non-dollar settlement frameworks. It need not replicate OPEC’s binding production management function but should provide institutional scaffolding for the bloc’s collective energy interests, with a permanent secretariat co-hosted by India and China.
2. Create a BRICS Energy Intelligence Unit: Commission a standing analytical body — housed within the NDB or a designated national institution — to monitor oil market dynamics, model price scenario implications for all member states, and produce quarterly assessments of OPEC developments, Gulf geopolitical risks, and BRICS energy trade flows.
3. Develop a BRICS Strategic Petroleum Reserve Compact: Explore a collective strategic petroleum reserve arrangement, modeled loosely on the IEA’s emergency sharing mechanism but calibrated to BRICS member needs. Priority should be given to securing India and China’s import supply resilience during Hormuz disruptions.

6.2 De-Dollarization and Currency Settlement

The following measures are recommended to accelerate the BRICS de-dollarization agenda in energy markets:

1. Deepen UAE-BRICS Integration on Currency Settlement: Leverage the UAE’s commercial freedom outside OPEC to accelerate the dirham’s role in  multilateral energy settlement frameworks. Prioritize full interoperability between mBridge (UAE, China, Thailand, Hong Kong), India’s UPI platform, and Russia’s SPFS for energy transactions, targeting a 25 percent share of intra-BRICS energy trade settled in non-dollar BRICS currencies by 2028.
2. Expand the NDB’s Energy Finance Mandate: Direct the New Development Bank to issue energy-sector bonds denominated in a basket of BRICS currencies, with proceeds ring-fenced for Gulf-to-Global-South energy infrastructure, including pipelines, LNG terminals, and renewable energy projects in Africa and South Asia.
3. Promote a BRICS Crude Oil Price Benchmark: Explore the feasibility of a BRICS-anchored crude oil price index quoted in a multi-currency basket, as an alternative reference point to Brent or WTI. This would reduce BRICS members’ structural exposure to dollar-denominated pricing volatility.

6.3 Gulf Diplomacy and Internal BRICS Cohesion

The following diplomatic measures are recommended to manage the Saudi-UAE tension and preserve BRICS internal cohesion:

1. Appoint BRICS Gulf Diplomatic Facilitators: Formally mandate India and China — as the largest economies and the most important trade partners of both Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to provide quiet diplomatic facilitation between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Sustained engagement on a shared BRICS energy governance framework can serve as a practical vehicle for bilateral de-escalation.
2. Accelerate Saudi Arabia’s Full BRICS Membership: Prioritize completing the procedural steps for Saudi Arabia’s formal BRICS accession. Shared institutional membership is a more durable basis for Saudi-UAE engagement than ad-hoc diplomacy, and Riyadh’s full participation is essential to any meaningful BRICS energy governance framework.
3. Engage the UAE on BRICS Geopolitical Positioning: In diplomatic bilaterals, BRICS members should make clear to Abu Dhabi that its dual positioning — BRICS membership alongside deep Abraham Accords ties — is sustainable only if the UAE actively supports the bloc’s multipolar energy agenda. Quiet expectations management is preferable to public pressure.

6.4 Hormuz and Supply Chain Resilience

The following measures are recommended to build BRICS resilience against Gulf supply disruptions:

1. Commission Hormuz Scenario Planning: Task the proposed BRICS Energy Intelligence Unit with producing comprehensive scenario analyses for sustained Strait of Hormuz disruptions at 30, 60, and 90-day intervals, including modeled price impacts, import substitution options, and reserve drawdown strategies for India and China.
2. Invest in Alternative Transit Infrastructure: Through NDB and bilateral development finance channels, accelerate investment in alternative crude transit routes: the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline (which bypasses Hormuz), Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, and potential new LNG and pipeline corridors
   connecting Gulf producers to Indian Ocean and South Asian markets.
3. Coordinate with Non-BRICS Producers on Supply Security: Engage non-BRICS Gulf producers (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar) in dialogue on shared supply-security arrangements. A Hormuz crisis harms all Gulf exporters equally; coordination on emergency supply protocols need not be confined to formal BRICS membership.

The UAE’s departure from OPEC is not merely a bilateral falling-out between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, nor simply a technical dispute over production quotas. It is a geopolitical inflection point that reflects the fracturing of the post-1970s energy governance architecture and the deepening contest between a dollar-centered energy order and an emerging multipolar alternative.

For BRICS, the moment is both an opportunity and a test. The bloc has the institutional foundations — the NDB, BRICS Pay, mBridge, and its expanding membership — to begin building credible alternative energy governance frameworks. But it also faces the challenge of managing internal tensions between members with divergent and sometimes conflicting energy interests. The UAE’s commercial freedom outside OPEC can serve BRICS’ de-dollarization agenda — but only if the bloc’s diplomacy is agile enough to keep both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh inside the same strategic tent.

The era of a single, Saudi-anchored cartel managing the global oil market on terms broadly favorable to the dollar system is ending. What replaces it — whether
productive multipolarity or destabilizing fragmentation — will be shaped substantially by the choices BRICS members make in the months and years ahead.

2016    UAE joins the expanded OPEC+ framework alongside Russia and other non-OPEC producers, contributing to coordinated production management.

2020    The UAE normalizes relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords, signaling a major shift in its foreign policy orientation and deepening ties with the US and Israel.

2021    Significant OPEC+ tensions emerge as the UAE pushes for a higher baseline production level before agreeing to extend existing cuts. Abu Dhabi wins a partial concession but the episode reveals deep strategic divergence with Riyadh.

March 2023    The Wall Street Journal reports that the UAE is internally debating withdrawal from OPEC, citing frustration with quota constraints and widening differences with Saudi Arabia. Oil prices fall nearly 3% on the report before recovering. The UAE officially denies it has plans to leave.

2023–2024    UAE-Saudi relations deteriorate further over Yemen policy. The UAE supports the Southern Transitional Council’s power grab; Saudi Arabia bombs what it describes as a UAE-backed weapons shipment. Bilateral summits become infrequent.

January 2024    The UAE formally joins BRICS alongside Iran, Egypt, and Ethiopia, deepening its engagement with the bloc’s de-dollarization and alternative financial architecture agenda.

Late 2025    UAE-Saudi Arabia tensions escalate sharply over Yemen. The UAE’s ADNOC investment plan ($145 billion through 2030) and capacity target (5 million b/d by 2027) make OPEC quota constraints increasingly costly.

28 February 2026    Joint US-Israel strikes on Iran begin. The UAE comes under sustained Iranian missile and drone attacks. The Strait of Hormuz faces disruption as Iran targets shipping lanes.

March–April 2026    As the Iran conflict continues, Saudi Arabia and the UAE diverge on preferred diplomatic outcomes. Saudi Arabia joins Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey in seeking a negotiated solution; the UAE demands stronger security guarantees and opposes a settlement that does not constrain Iran’s regional capabilities. The bilateral
relationship reaches its lowest point in years.

28 April 2026    The UAE officially announces its withdrawal from OPEC and the OPEC+ framework, citing “national interests” and energy strategy. The announcement is made without prior consultation with Saudi Arabia or other OPEC members. Oil prices drop sharply on global markets.

1 May 2026    UAE withdrawal from OPEC formally takes effect. The country’s near-term production remains constrained by the Strait of Hormuz closure, but analysts forecast significant market share competition from the UAE beginning in 2027 as the strait reopens and expanded capacity comes online.

May 2026 (ongoing)   OPEC announces it will “recalibrate” its strategy, with options including expanding membership and seeking higher output from existing members. Analysts note OPEC is “structurally weaker” but unlikely to dissolve. BRICS institutions begin informal discussions on energy governance implications.

India-Specific Strategic Considerations

India occupies a uniquely exposed position in the aftermath of the UAE’s OPEC withdrawal. As simultaneously one of the world’s largest oil importers, a
foundational BRICS member, and the Gulf’s most important South Asian partner, New Delhi faces intersecting pressures that require careful and proactive
management.

Energy Security and Import Diversification

India currently imports approximately 4.8 million barrels per day, with a significant share sourced from Gulf OPEC producers. The UAE withdrawal and associated OPEC weakening creates a more fragmented Gulf supplier landscape. In the short to medium term, a liberated UAE with expanding capacity and no quota constraints is likely to compete aggressively for Indian market share, which may benefit Indian refiners through competitive pricing.

However, the same dynamic that could lower UAE prices also increases volatility risk, since OPEC’s residual price-stabilization function will be weaker. Indian petroleum ministry planners should model import cost scenarios under three conditions: UAE at full capacity (5 mb/d), a Saudi-UAE price war, and sustained Hormuz disruption. India’s strategic petroleum reserve, currently holding approximately 37 million barrels, covers only 9–10 days of net imports. Expanding this to 30 days should be treated as a national security priority.

The Dirham’s Role in De-Dollarization

India’s use of the UAE dirham as a settlement currency for Russian crude purchases is already a significant development in practical de-dollarization. This arrangement should be deepened and institutionalized through the mBridge platform and bilateral Reserve Bank of India–UAE Central Bank currency swap mechanisms. India should also advocate, within BRICS, for a formal framework that legitimizes multi-currency energy settlement as a standard practice rather than a sanctions-circumvention workaround. New Delhi should be cautious, however, about moving too rapidly or visibly on this front. India’s External Affairs Minister has been clear that India has no policy of displacing the dollar as a reserve currency. This public position provides diplomatic cover and should be maintained while practical diversification proceeds at pace.

Mediating Saudi-UAE Tensions

India has deep bilateral relationships with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE — economically through trade and remittances, and strategically through defence
partnerships and energy supply chains. New Delhi is arguably the BRICS member best positioned to serve as an informal mediator between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. This role should be pursued quietly, through diplomatic back-channels, with the goal of preserving both relationships and anchoring both Gulf states
in cooperative BRICS energy governance frameworks. India should also use its bilateral weight to press both Saudi Arabia and the UAE toward completing Saudi Arabia’s formal BRICS accession. A BRICS that includes both Gulf states in full institutional standing is a stronger platform for Indian energy diplomacy than one defined by Saudi-UAE rivalry.

China-Specific Strategic Considerations

China’s stakes in the UAE’s OPEC withdrawal are substantial and multidimensional. As the world’s largest oil importer, a leading proponent of BRICS de-dollarization, and the primary architect of the mBridge digital currency platform on which the UAE’s central bank is a founding partner, Beijing is at the center of virtually every strategic dynamic this development has set in motion.

Oil Import Security and Price Management

China imports over 11 million barrels per day, making it the single most price-sensitive major economy to Gulf supply dynamics. OPEC’s structural weakening, combined with the Strait of Hormuz closure and UAE’s forthcoming unconstrained production expansion, creates a complex pricing environment. In the medium term, Chinese strategic planners should welcome the prospect of increased UAE production competing with Saudi supply — as competition between Gulf producers likely produces lower Chinese import prices. However, Beijing must balance this against its interest in Saudi Arabia’s fiscal and political stability, given the Riyadh-Beijing strategic relationship.

China’s strategic petroleum reserve is among the world’s largest, estimated at over 900 million barrels (approximately 90 days of net imports). This provides significant buffer against Hormuz disruption scenarios. Nonetheless, Chinese planners should model scenarios in which the UAE’s expanded capacity comes online simultaneously with a Saudi production response, as this could produce a price collapse that stresses multiple BRICS producer economies simultaneously.

mBridge and the Petroyuan

The UAE’s centrality to mBridge — the BIS-backed multi-CBDC platform for instant interbank settlement — is now directly relevant to China’s petroyuan ambitions. With the UAE no longer institutionally anchored to OPEC’s implicit dollar-pricing norms, Abu Dhabi has greater flexibility to denominate bilateral energy transactions in yuan or a multi-currency basket. China should move quickly to deepen the UAE’s mBridge participation and work toward denominating a meaningful share of UAE-China bilateral oil trade in yuan, with the UAE acting as a Gulf hub for yuan-denominated energy settlement across the region.

This initiative should be framed diplomatically not as a challenge to the dollar but as a natural extension of bilateral trade efficiency — a framing the UAE itself has every interest in supporting, given its desire to avoid being drawn into US-China financial competition. China should also ensure that mBridge’s technical architecture and governance structure allows for Saudi Arabia’s future participation, so that Riyadh has a clear pathway to join the platform once its full BRICS accession is complete.

Managing the Saudi Relationship

Beijing’s most delicate task is maintaining strong and growing strategic relationships with both Saudi Arabia and the UAE simultaneously, as those two states enter a period of open rivalry. China is Saudi Arabia’s largest oil customer and has made significant investments in the kingdom’s Vision 2030 economic transformation. It cannot afford to be seen as favoring Abu Dhabi at Riyadh’s expense.

Chinese policymakers should articulate clearly, in high-level bilateral engagements with Riyadh, that Beijing’s deepening UAE partnerships — including on  Bridge and non-dollar settlement — are designed to create architecture that will eventually benefit Saudi Arabia too. The invitation for Saudi Arabia to join mBridge should be extended formally and promptly. A Saudi Arabia inside the BRICS energy settlement ecosystem is strategically far more valuable to China than one that drifts back toward exclusive US security and dollar alignment.

Russia-Specific Strategic Considerations

For Russia, the UAE’s departure from OPEC is a structurally favorable development that aligns with Moscow’s core energy and geopolitical interests. However, it also introduces new risks that require careful management, particularly regarding the UAE’s strategic positioning between the BRICS bloc and the US-led Western alliance.

OPEC+ and Russian Production Freedom

Russia has been the most consequential violator of OPEC+ quota discipline since the agreement’s inception in 2016. Moscow has consistently produced above  agreed levels, relying on Saudi Arabia’s tolerance and its own geopolitical leverage to avoid meaningful consequences. The UAE’s departure weakens OPEC’s internal enforcement capacity further, reducing the marginal cost of Russia’s own non-compliance and giving Moscow greater de facto freedom in its production and export decisions.

Russian energy strategists should nonetheless avoid over-reading this as license for unconstrained production escalation. The same market dynamics that free the UAE to produce at will — approaching peak global demand, rising shale competition from the US — also apply to Russia. A global oil price collapse driven by
simultaneous UAE and Russian production surges would be deeply damaging to Russian fiscal revenues, which remain heavily dependent on energy exports
despite post-2022 diversification efforts.

The UAE Transit Hub: Deepening the Relationship

The UAE has become an indispensable logistical and financial hub for Russian energy exports since 2022 Western sanctions cut Moscow off from much of the
traditional dollar-denominated energy trade infrastructure. Dubai-based trading firms handle a significant share of Russian crude and products; the UAE dirham has become a key settlement currency for Russian oil sales to Asian buyers; and ADNOC has maintained discreet commercial relationships with Russian energy companies that other Gulf actors have avoided.

The UAE’s departure from OPEC, and its associated commercial freedom, reduces one potential source of institutional pressure on this arrangement. Russian
policymakers should move to formalize and deepen the UAE transit hub relationship through direct government-to-government energy cooperation agreements, expanded dirham-ruble currency swap lines, and Russian participation in UAE-based energy trading platforms. The goal should be to make the Russia-UAE energy corridor structurally robust and difficult to reverse, regardless of future geopolitical fluctuations.

Watching the Western Vector

Russia’s key concern with the UAE’s OPEC exit is the question of whose interests it ultimately serves. The Trump administration has long sought to weaken OPEC, and some analysts have characterized the UAE’s move as strategically aligned with US interests in fragmenting the cartel. Moscow should monitor whether the UAE begins coordinating production decisions with the US — for example, by timing production increases to coincide with US efforts to lower global prices — or whether Abu Dhabi is genuinely pursuing an independent commercial strategy.

Russian diplomats should raise this question directly but diplomatically in BRICS forums, framing it not as an accusation but as a call for the UAE to demonstrate its multipolar commitments through concrete actions: full participation in BRICS Pay, expanded non-dollar energy settlement, and visible coordination with BRICS partners on energy governance. If the UAE’s post-OPEC commercial strategy aligns with BRICS interests, Russia should be a strong supporter. If it emerges as a Trojan horse for Western energy market fragmentation, BRICS cohesion demands that this be named clearly.

The author, Dr Anita Yadav, is an industry veteran, having served as an Advisor to the New Development Bank in Shanghai, between 2021-2025 and currently based in Dubai. These are her personal thoughts and not endorsed by any institution.